Given the referenced situation in my previous article, Afghanistan Reality will not Bow to Presidential Politics, we are left at the crossroads of determining what the proper path forward for the war in Afghanistan might be. Recognizing that our current options at the national level are, again, a fixed withdrawal with a continuation of current policies (Obama) versus a somewhat though very imperceptibly less fixed withdrawal with a continuation of current policies (Romney), it is safe to assume that the course to be recommended differs greatly from those “options.”
So we have established that we cannot continue the mission, but just quitting entirely leads to the very real threat of the Taliban retaking control and allowing the same Islamic extremism that caused 9/11 a safe place to train and grow. What is needed is a mission change; a retrenchment to a realistic and attainable goal that can be fought towards with less unnecessary risk of American lives and less overall cost. The fact is that we cannot continue to tie our fortunes to a failing local government and weak-kneed allies.
There are several key adjustments in strategy and mission required. A true solution does not lend itself to a bumper sticker, so they are detailed:
1) The mission is to keep the Taliban from developing a stronghold. It is not to build a government, it is not to pacify areas, it is not to build roads. It is not anything but preventing Afghanistan, in its relatively lawless state, from being used as a base for future attacks on the United States and its interests.
2) Troops will no longer embed with Afghan police or military units. American trainers will assist the Afghan Army in their academies, and missions will be coordinated as necessary with the Afghan military as is necessary, beneficial, and as they are willing. If the rest of the new strategy is unacceptable to the Afghan government to the point that they are unwilling to accede to these joint actions, then the US military will simply operate independently. The gain of working with Afghans beyond duly employed and vetted interpreters is not worth the danger of doing so, and discourages any negotiation on this issue.
3) The rules of engagement will be appropriate with the situation. Night raids will resume, Americans will take the lead on patrols, mosques will be entered if they are used as bases for the Taliban, and detention of enemy combatants will return to US hands. No apologies will be issued for legitimate military operations. Combat missions will all be targeted, with preference for helicopter-based movement. Drone, helicopter, and fixed wing overflight will monitor the countryside for signs of Taliban infiltration.
4) The force footprint will be adjusted to three Brigade Combat Teams (approximately 4,000 troops each), with one based each at the three of the main bases in Afghanistan – Bagram, Kandahar, and Herat, which allows for proper distribution. They will be supported by two total aviation brigades (attack and transport helicopters) split appropriately amongst the bases, and enough Air Force personnel to provide airlift support to each base along with airfield security, with fixed-wing close air support provided through Air Force fighter and bomber wings, proportionally reduced in size along with ground forces, and Navy carrier-based fighters. Along with these conventional forces, a proportional amount of special operations personnel would be based in the country for unconventional warfare and high value target raids. The total size of the force would be around 30,000, about half the current level.
5) Our allies will all be given the option to withdraw immediately to whatever level they so choose, without any ill will. Any who remain will allocate as necessary. The multiple levels of counterproductive international military hierarchy (ISAF, ISAF Joint Command, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan) will be dissolved and reconstituted around a single commander with a small and reasonable support element.
Once this realignment of mission and force arrayal is complete, one might rationally ask to what effect it is being deployed, what the goals are, what the future looks like, and what the end of the war looks like.
With the forces appropriately realigned and re-missioned, the Taliban must once again be effectively crushed as they were in the course of the initial invasion. This is entirely possible with a refocused military with a more appropriate set of rules of engagement, as evidenced by how quickly they were crushed in 2001-2002. Once the ground commanders are confident that the Taliban has been effectively disrupted and dispersed out of the country, likely after 1-2 years from the mission change, all conventional forces can be withdrawn from the country.
Key to this withdrawal would be its conditionality. We would leave, minus whatever minimal force is negotiated with the Afghan government to assist with training, provide drone overflight, et cetera, but with the commitment that we would continue intelligence and counterterror flights as necessary, and that should the Taliban become resurgent we would recommit ground forces for a fixed period of time.
Now many who see this suggestion would see it as counterintuitive. To commit to reintroducing combat troops in a more invasion-type scenario seems to imply a higher cost in terms of lives and dollars, along with the stigma associated with “fighting the same war again.” This, however, is an irrational fear.
The fact is that the invasion and clearance phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, which for these purposes we will consider to be fiscal year 2002 plus the half month of September 2001, came to about $25 billion inflation-adjusted dollars. The average annual cost of the occupation phase, meanwhile, comes to $51.3 billion. The cost in lives is even starker, with 61 US military personnel dying in calendar year 2002 and September-December 2001, against an average of 208 per year for all other years of the war.
The question then is not if we would rather “win” the war, it is this – is it better to “fight the same war again later,” perhaps a few more times over the course of the next two decades, or is it better to be fighting the same war continuously until “later” arrives? Any rational student of international relations or security will agree that leaving Afghanistan en masse with no commitment to preventing Taliban resurgence will create a safe haven for potential future terrorist attacks. So it is not either quit or stay, it is stay and tread water (while gradually sinking), or leave after setting the table for the current Afghan military to have a shot at winning, with the committed and acknowledged ability for our military to again do what they do best: invade the country and crush the enemy, then leave.
So the final question is then, how do we do make this happen? How do we get such a sea change of strategy and mission, one that would likely offend our Afghan “hosts” and possibly our allies, to occur? To this, there is a simple answer, and a blunt one: bold, decisive leadership.
Leadership that takes the hard right over the easy wrong, leadership that recognizes our position as the sole global superpower, and makes decisions that reflect that strength. Leadership that, while possibly disliked globally, would be respected for its firmness and solidity of judgment. We have even been given, if one could call frame such a series of tragedies as a positive, the political cover of the spate of insider attacks by Afghan military and police on our personnel, a solid reason that would entirely justify a move away from building the current corrupt Afghan government and towards simply securing the area.
So that is it then. Leadership. Will we get it, or will we get more of the same? Only time and an election will tell.
The US Military is not configured for this type of warfare. We can crush and enemy Army very quickly, but occupation is a different matter. The pick away at you, and knowing people who spent time in Afghanistan prior to our getting there will tell you they do not take orders well from anyone. That includes the Taliban. Our best bet is to fight a covert war, taking out Taliban leadership and co opting the Tribal Leaders and Warlords. Let the Afghan Army and Police fight for their own lives. If I am reading you right it is another "surge". I think it is time to give up that tactic and learn to understand our enemy and use that knowledge.
I'm sorry to disappoint you, but you are in fact misreading the post. I reference immediately cutting the troop levels approximately in half, and the general goal would be a withdrawal within 1-2 years from the realignment and change in strategy. I agree with your point about occupation, as I explicitly state that the military is designed to invade and crush an enemy (as we did initially in Afghanistan). My key points are a change of strategy, and a removal of troops with the explicit commitment to return if necessary, which would be anywhere on the spectrum from covert actions or airstrikes through to full invasion and, again, quick withdrawal. Your suggestion of a "covert war" would bring with it its own set of questions. Who does the infiltration? Who supports any CIA or other intelligence agents? How do we co-opt the tribal leaders and warlords? We've been trying to do that for years - what is their incentive for being co-opted, and why haven't they been co-opted yet despite our best efforts? Basically, I'd as you to reread the post, as it appears we are speaking at cross-purposes.
Considering Afghanistan’s institutional state (a government that has legitimacy and control problems in parts of the country), tribal differences, neighbors with policies that are unreliable or even hostile to U.S. interests, among other factors, odds favor a continuing guerrilla campaign whether or not the U.S. is present.
The goal would be to bring their force to an early 2003/late 2002 level, by doing the same thing we did to get them there - fight a war, not an occupation. By leaving afterwards, we remove a major target for insurgency, but most certainly they will try again. The difference would be that if and when they became strong enough to take hold of any areas of the country as a safe haven - not fight hit and runs, but actually take control - they would face the imminent threat of military force from us. In order to control an area, they must reform to the point of being observable and would thus give us a target to attack.
Thank you for taking the time to write this and the previous article. I think both are impressive pieces, even if I'm not sure I agree 100%. (I'm at least at 80% agreement right now.) :^)
As for offending already somewhat anti-American elements in the broader Muslim world, I would look at that as somewhat of an ancillary concern. First of all, most of these elements get upset at literally everything we do, and a change in strategy and tactics, though it might provide a cover reason for anti-American protests, would not do anything but that - provide cover for something that would happen already. Secondly, the very act of us leaving at the conclusion of the war would neutralize some of the less fixed protests. I don't, however, believe that we should hold our national interests or our allies hostage to the foibles and opinions of those inclined to hate us already. I could get into more detail on the broader approach for the region, but, as I'm sure you agree, that would likely take another 2-3 blogs.
While there is little dispute that the Taliban was dispersed in the 2001 war, 2012 is not 2001. In 2001, the Taliban had governmental assets and organized units. Those were smashed. Today, the Taliban is fragmented and undertaking a guerrilla campaign. The tasks and tactics required to deal with a guerrilla campaign are very different from those that were undertaken in 2001.
I can't see any details on your profile, so I'm not sure what experience with the tactics and procedures of the Taliban in the past few years you're bringing to the table. That said, I am entirely aware of the nature of insurgency and guerrilla tactics - starting with the fact that they can only be fought against an occupying or governing power. The moment the Taliban has driven the Afghan government into hiding or exploited our lack of presence in an area by taking control, they by the very nature of so doing have coalesced into units that are very much able to be targeted, attacked, and cleared from an area. Farah province in 2009 is a perfect example. Using a conventional clearance tactic, the US Army, Afghan Army, and USASOC elements were able to engage and clear the Taliban from the entire center of the province in the course of a few days of direct action. The Taliban then, after a long period of inactivity, returned to insurgency and guerrilla tactics, because the area was occupied. Given that we have no need to stay and wage counterinsurgency, and would have no fear of al Qaeda having a safe haven unless the Taliban truly controlled an area, I can assure you that we would be able to target and clear them in such a case.
Thanks for the compliments again. You do have a point, in that it would essentially be a take it or leave it scenario. If they leave it, we realistically could not just stay, or we'd be fighting the government forces and the Taliban, which would only help our enemies. That said, if they leave it, we could state for the record, so the international community fully understands, that we will return if the government fails to keep the peace or maintain control. In such a situation, the government would be so weak that they would almost certainly welcome any assistance in clearing the resurgent Taliban. That said, I personally think that if they are thinking clearly, they will see that if we just up and leave the clock immediately starts ticking on their government and their lives. When framed in such a way, it would be difficult for people like President Karzai to say no to a change in strategy. Also, "cooperation" is a matter of degree - are they really "cooperating" when there are dozens of insider attacks, when Karzai repeatedly and publicly opposes our tactics, or says for no reason whatsoever that he would side with Pakistan if we invaded, or calls for the arrest of US Soldiers? None of this is to dispute your point, but to frame it into a broader context.
I’m leveraging experience in Washington and also the private sector. The circumstances in Afghanistan and Iraq are, in part, a consequence bad risk assessment. British and Soviet experience vividly illustrated Afghanistan’s risks. There, governing authority has long been fragmented along tribal and ethnic lines. An objective analysis could only show that the task of building an effective central government would be difficult and the dangers of insurgency would be great. In Iraq, long-simmering rivalries among the Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds, were suppressed under the Hussein dictatorship. There was a classic risk that loss of central authority following Hussein’s fall would unlock those rivalries, perhaps in violent fashion. General Anthony Zinni’s “Desert Crossing” exercise and General Eric Shinseki’s worries about manpower were realistic appraisals. Nevertheless, “best case” scenarios drove the pre-war planning. Given both countries’ realities and the events that unfolded, I’m not inclined to accept seemingly rosy assumptions. I agree that U.S. strategy should focus on ensuring that no faction be permitted to gain a position that would pose a threat to U.S. interests and allies. I don’t agree that the Taliban can easily be “dispersed” with a guerrilla campaign underway and the differing goals of Afghanistan’s neighbors. I do believe that the risks can reasonably be managed with a coherent diplomatic, political, and military strategy.
I agree with your assessment of the problems that got us into this situation, and similarly set us up for a very hard road in Iraq, but the lessons learned from these failures of judgment have little to do with presenting a positive solution to what we do from here, where we currently find ourselves. I too would agree that the Taliban could not be "dispersed" if they are simply waging a guerrilla campaign. My point about dispersing them is that they would not be waging a guerrilla campaign in such a circumstance. There are dozens of examples of us clearing the Taliban and quite literally dispersing them from entrenched safe zones between the invasion phase and today. I propose we pull back and do just that once again throughout the country, to set the table best we can for the Afghan Army, then leave. In any circumstance where we were to return, it would again be to clear the areas occupied by the Taliban. Again, definitionally, they cannot fight an insurgency in areas they occupy, or use guerrilla tactics if they are defending land they hold - and they have not done so in any case during those various sweeps we have made through Taliban strongholds throughout the years (they have generally stood and fought). The problem has been our continued focus on building a government, which both allows the Taliban to grow due to the failures of that government and a lack of focus on them, and creates targets for them to launch insurgent attacks against.